Abstract. Differing inputs obfuscation (diO) is a strengthening of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) that has recently found applications to improving the efficiency and generality of obfuscation, functional encryption, and related primitives. Roughly speaking, a diO scheme ensures that the obfuscations of two efficiently generated programs are indistinguishable not only if the two programs are equivalent, but also if it is hard to find an input on which their outputs differ. The above "indistinguishability" and "hardness" conditions should hold even in the presence of an auxiliary input that is generated together with the programs. The recent works of Boyle and Pass (ePrint 2013) and Garg et al. (Crypto 2014) cast serious doubt on the plausibility of general-purpose diO with respect to general auxiliary inputs. This leaves open the existence of a variant of diO that is plausible, simple, and useful for applications. We suggest such a diO variant that we call public-coin diO. A publiccoin diO restricts the original definition of diO by requiring the auxiliary input to be a public random string which is given as input to all relevant algorithms. In contrast to standard diO, we argue that it remains very plausible that current candidate constructions of iO for circuits satisfy the public-coin diO requirement. We demonstrate the usefulness of the new notion by showing that several applications of diO can be obtained by relying on the public-coin variant instead. These include constructions of succinct obfuscation and functional encryption schemes for Turing Machines, where the size of the obfuscated code or keys is essentially independent of the input-length, running time and space.
Introduction
General-purpose obfuscation refers to the concept of transforming an arbitrary program so that its functionality is preserved, but otherwise rendering the program "unintelligible." This concept has intrigued cryptographers for decades, and led to multiple attempts at formalization (most notably [BGI + 12]). A critical goal in obfuscation research has been to identify the strongest notions of obfuscation that are plausible and have wide applicability. General-purpose obfuscation, however, has proven to be perched precariously between possibility and impossibility.
On the one extreme, virtual black-box obfuscation (VBB) is an ideal form of obfuscation that captures the intuitive notion of obfuscation and often can be directly used in applications. Unfortunately, this notion is impossible in the sense that it provably cannot be realized for certain contrived classes of programs [BGI + 12], or for quite large classes of programs under contrived auxiliary inputs [GK05] .
On the other extreme, the most liberal notion of general-purpose obfuscation is indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BGI + 12, GR07]. An iO scheme for a class of "programs" is an efficient randomized algorithm that maps any program P into a functionally equivalent obfuscated program P such that if P 1 and P 2 compute the same function then their obfuscations P 1 and P 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
The first plausible construction of a general-purpose iO scheme was given in 2013 by Garg et al. [GGH + 13b] . This construction and similar ones from [BR14, BGK + 14] render the existence of an iO scheme a plausible assumption, since there are currently no attacks or other evidence suggesting that these constructions fail to meet the iO requirements. In particular, no theoretical impossibility results are known for iO schemes even for contrived classes of programs and auxiliary inputs.
On the downside, the security guarantee of iO appears to be too weak for most natural applications of obfuscation. A recent line of work, originating from [GGH + 13b, SW14], has made impressive progress on applying iO towards a wide array of cryptographic applications. However, these applications are still not as broad as one might expect, and the corresponding constructions and their analysis are significantly more complex than those that could be obtained from an ideal obfuscation primitive. Indeed, this may be the case because the definition of iO seems to capture only a quite minimal property of obfuscation.
In search of the "strongest plausible assumption." The above limitations of iO motivate the search for stronger notions of obfuscation that support more applications and give rise to simpler constructions and security proofs. Such a stronger notion should be plausible, in the sense that current candidate obfuscation constructions can be conjectured to satisfy the stronger requirements without contradicting other theoretical or empirical evidence. Another important feature is succinct description, ruling out contrived notions whose security requirements refer separately to each application. This leads to the following question, which is at the center of our work:
Is there a plausible, useful, and succinctly described notion of obfuscation that captures stronger security requirements than indistinguishability obfuscation?
Differing inputs obfuscation. A seemingly promising positive answer to our question was given by the notion of differing inputs obfuscation (diO). First proposed in [BGI + 12] and recently revisited in [ABG + 13, BCP14], diO has found a diverse array of applications that do not seem to follow from traditional iO (see below for more details). Roughly speaking, a diO scheme ensures that the obfuscations of two efficiently generated programs P 1 and P 2 are indistinguishable not only if they compute the same function, but also if it is hard for an adversary to find an input x on which the two programs differ, namely x such that P 1 (x) = P 2 (x). The above "indistinguishability" and "hardness" conditions should hold even in the presence of an auxiliary input aux that is generated together with the programs and is given as input both to the adversary trying to find an input x as above and to the distinguisher who tries to distinguish between the two obfuscated programs. Indeed, different applications give rise to different distributions of aux.
However, the recent works of [BP13, GGHW14] cast serious doubts on the plausibility of general-purpose diO with respect to general auxiliary inputs. In particular, [GGHW14] showed that the existence of diO with respect to arbitrary auxiliary inputs contradicts a certain "special-purpose obfuscation" conjecture. At a high level, the impossibility result of [GGHW14] proceeds as follows: Consider a pair of programs P 1 and P 2 that produce different one-bit outputs only on inputs x = (m, σ) that consist of valid message-signature pairs with respect to a fixed unforgeable signature scheme verification key. Now we consider another program D which takes a program P as input, and then hashes P to compute m = h(P ) together with a signature σ on m. It then feeds x = (m, σ) as input to P , and outputs the first bit of P (x). Now, the auxiliary input given to the adversary will be a "special-purpose obfuscation" of this program D. The specialpurpose obfuscation conjecture of [GGHW14] is that even given this auxiliary input, it is still hard for the adversary to obtain any valid message-signature pair. This assumption seems quite plausible, for instance if D is obfuscated using the obfuscators of [GGH + 13b, BR14, BGK + 14]. Now, it is evident that the adversary can distinguish between any obfuscations of P 1 and P 2 using the auxiliary input, and yet by the special-purpose assumption, the adversary cannot compute any valid message-signature pair, and therefore cannot find a differing input.
What causes impossibility for diO? If we would like to consider general notions of obfuscation that capture security requirements beyond indistinguishability obfuscation, it is imperative that we understand the roots of impossibility for diO. Indeed, it is not difficult to evade the impossibility results of [BP13, GGHW14] by simply assuming that diO only holds with respect to specific auxiliary input distributions, as has been suggested in [ABG + 13, BCP14, BP13]. However, this approach would yield disparate special-purpose variants of the diO assumption for each potential application scenario, with little clarity on why any particular such assumption should be valid. This would defeat our goal of obtaining a general and succinctly described assumption. Therefore, we seek to understand the essential flaw that the works of [BP13, GGHW14] , and others like it, can exploit using auxiliary inputs.
Our starting point is the suggestion, made in several previous works [BCP14, BP13, BCCT13, BCPR14] , to specifically consider an auxiliary input that is uniformly random, since at least some applications of diO and other suspect primitives seem to work with just uniformly random auxiliary inputs. This certainly seems a great deal safer, and does avoid the specific impossibility results known. However, our starting observation is that even a uniformly random auxiliary input could potentially be problematic in that the auxiliary input could be chosen so that it is the output of a one-way permutation -thus there would still be a secret about the auxiliary input that is hidden from the adversary. Although we don't currently see a way to exploit this to obtain an impossibility result, could this eventually lead to trouble?
Indeed, in the negative results of [BP13, GGHW14] , and similarly in other impossibility results using auxiliary inputs (e.g. [GK05] ), it is critical that the auxiliary input can contain trapdoor information. In other words, secrets can be used to choose the auxiliary input, and these secrets are not themselves revealed to the adversary. (In the case of [GGHW14] , this trapdoor information includes the secret signing key of the signature scheme, and the randomness used to obtain the obfuscation of the program D.) Our objective, then, is to formulate a notion of diO that avoids this possibility altogether.
Public-coin differing inputs obfuscation. Building upon the observations above, we introduce the notion of public-coin diO. A public-coin diO restricts the original definition of diO by requiring the auxiliary input aux to be the actual random coins that were given to the program that sampled P 1 and P 2 . Thus, in public-coin diO, the auxiliary input is not chosen by a sampling algorithm, but rather the auxiliary input is simply a set of public coins that are made available to all algorithms. In particular, this means that it must be hard to find an input x such that P 1 (x) = P 2 (x) even given all information about how P 1 and P 2 were generated. This rules out the possibility of planting a trapdoor in the auxiliary input, an option that was critical for proving the negative evidence against diO [BP13, GGHW14] .
Indeed, we know of no evidence of impossibility for public-coin diO. The public coin restriction appears to cut a wide path around the impossibility result of [GGHW14] . Intuitively, public-coin diO requires that even "nature" -which is computationally bounded but all-seeing -cannot find any inputs on which the two programs P 1 and P 2 will differ. This is important because not only [BP13, GGHW14] , but also all previous impossibility results on VBB ob-fuscation (e.g [BGI + 12, GK05]) used the input/output behavior of the program to plant hidden inputs on which the output of the program is too revealing. But in public-coin diO, the existence of such planted inputs would automatically rule out any security guarantee from diO, since given knowledge of these planted inputs it is easy to find a differing input. Thus, intuitively speaking, this suggests that an impossibility result for public-coin diO would need to find actual weaknesses in the obfuscation mechanism itself -some way to distinguish obfuscations that does not use the input/output behavior of the underlying programs in any way. Existing security proofs in generic 4 models [BR14, BGK + 14] offer strong evidence that such an impossibility result is unlikely to exist.
We also view our public coin restriction as being a natural limitation to place on diO. Indeed, while our notion is novel in the context of obfuscation, it is reminiscent of (but also quite different from) other scenarios in cryptography where the public-coin restriction was introduced in order to prevent the existence of trapdoor information. For example, in the context of trapdoor permutations, it was observed that allowing the input sampler to use general auxiliary information can lead to problematic constructions technically satisfying the definition of a trapdoor permutation but rendering applications of trapdoor permutations insecure [GR13] . To prevent this, the notion of enhanced trapdoor permutations limits the input samplers to be given only public coins as input. Separately, in the context of collision-resistant hash functions, the distinction between secret-coin and public-coin collision-resistant hash families was studied in [HR04] , where it was noted that some applications of collision-resistant hashing require public coins, since secret coins may enable the party picking the key to know impermissible trapdoor information. While these other public-coin primitives are quite different in nature from ours, we view our notion of public-coin diO to be as natural a variant as enhanced trapdoor permutations or public-coin collision resistant hash functions.
Bellare, Stepanovs, and Tessaro [BST14] presented a definitional framework for diO where security of obfuscation is parameterized by a class of samplers (instead of applying for all circuits). This allows one to define and study restricted forms of diO by considering different types of samplers. The central object in this framework is then to identify appropriate types of samplers (which, for example, do not suffer from the negative results of [BP13, GGHW14] ).
Our notion of public-coin diO can be cast in the framework of [BST14] by considering samplers that are public-coin. We put forward the case of public-coin samplers as an important notion worthy of further study. Our work demonstrates that the public-coin case is of general interest, evades the implausibility results of [BP13, GGHW14] at a fundamental level, and yields several applications which we discuss shortly.
On non-uniformity. Often, because auxiliary input can also capture nonuniformity, the issues of auxiliary input and non-uniformity are treated jointly in 4 The idealized adversary model considered in [BR14, BGK + 14] is a generic model for multilinear maps [GGH13a, CLT13] .
definitions. However, since we are introducing nontrivial constraints on auxiliary inputs, we deal with non-uniformity separately. We formulate our definitions to separate out the contributions of auxiliary input (which is a public coin input to the potentially non-uniform sampler), and non-uniform advice. Specifically, we take care to ensure that no secrets can be embedded in the non-uniform advice provided to the sampler, by allowing the non-uniform advice given to the differing-input finding algorithm to depend arbitrarily on the non-uniform advice given to the sampler. Thus, in particular, the non-uniform advice given to the differing-input finding algorithm can contain all secrets present in the non-uniform advice given to the sampler.
Applications of public-coin diO. While the public-coin limitation allows us to give a general definition that avoids all known techniques for proving impossibility, one may wonder whether this limitation also rules out known applications of diO. Indeed, at first glance, the situation may seem quite problematic, since an auxiliary input is typically used to capture the partial progress of a security reduction, which will almost always contain various secrets that must be kept from the adversary. Indeed, existing security proofs for applications of diO [ABG + 13, BCP14] proceed along these lines, and therefore do not carry over for public-coin diO.
In order to make use of public-coin diO, we need to ensure that a stronger property is true in the application scenario and throughout the hybrids in the security proof where the diO property is being used: We need to ensure that whenever the diO property is used, the two programs P 1 and P 2 being considered have the property that it is infeasible to find a differing input between P 1 and P 2 even given all the randomness used in the entire description of the hybrid experiment (except for the random coins of the obfuscation itself). This is sufficient: When using the diO property across two hybrids, we need that the obfuscations are indistinguishable to an all-knowing adversary that is privy to all randomness in these hybrids (except for the random coins of the obfuscation itself). But if the obfuscations are indistinguishable to an all-knowing adversary, then they are also indistinguishable to a more ignorant adversary. Thus, even if some secrets need to be hidden from the adversary in other hybrid experiments, the proof of security can go through.
Despite the flexibility of the above approach, there are still applications of diO in the literature where we do not know how to use public-coin diO in a similar way, because of the nature of the programs being obfuscated. For example, in [BCP14] , diO is used to obtain full security for functional encryption by obfuscating programs that deal explicitly with signatures, where a secret verification key of a signature scheme is hidden within obfuscated programs, and given the signing key it is possible to discover differing inputs. Since trapdoors are crucial in this approach, we do not know how to apply public-coin diO. The fact that public-coin diO does not generically replace diO for all applications illustrates the nontrivial nature of our restriction.
Nevertheless, we can use public-coin diO to obtain several interesting applications, as we now detail. Separate from the applications below, building on our work, public-coin diO has been used to replace the need for diO to achieve constant-round concurrent zero knowledge based on obfuscation [PPS15] .
Obfuscating Turing Machines / RAMs with unbounded inputs. Generally, obfuscation has been studied in the context of circuits [BGI + 12, GGH + 13b]. Of course, given a bound on both (1) the input length and (2) the running time, any Turing Machine or RAM program can be converted to an equivalent circuit. However, if either or both of these variables can be unbounded, then obfuscating Turing Machines presents new feasibility questions beyond obfuscating circuits.
Moreover, note that transforming the TM into an equivalent circuit results in a circuit whose size is proportional to the worst case running time of the TM. This leads to severe inefficiency since one would have to evaluate a rather large circuit for every input. Indeed, motivated by this issue, Goldwasser et al.
[GKP + 13a, GKP + 13b] introduced and studied the notion of input-specific run time in the context of several cryptographic primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09] , functional encryption [SW05, BSW11] , and attribute-based encryption [SW05, GPSW06] .
Using indistinguishability obfuscation alone, there has recently been exciting progress towards obfuscating Turing Machines directly (i.e., without first transforming it into a circuit). The recent works of Lin and Pass [LP14] , Canetti, Holmgren, Jain, and Vaikuntanathan [CHJV14] , and Bitansky, Garg, and Telang [BGT14] , show how to obfuscate Turing machines or RAM programs directly when both the input-length and the overall space of the computation is a-priori bounded. More specifically, [LP14, CHJV14, BGT14] first construct garbling schemes for Turing machines (with bounded input-length and space) and use them to obtain obfuscation for Turing machines under same constraints. The size of the obfuscated program in these constructions only depends on the maximum input length and space used by the computation (as opposed to worst case running time of the original TM). However, obtaining obfuscation of TMs from garbling schemes introduces its own subtleties due to which current constructions additionally require cryptographic assumptions of sub-exponential hardness.
The recent work of Koppula, Lewko, and Waters [KLW14] presents a novel construction of indistinguishability obfuscation for Turing Machines with bounded input length (and unbounded space), based only on iO for circuits and standard assumptions. In other words, the size of the obfuscated TM in the [KLW14] construction is polynomial in the maximum input length to be accepted by the obfuscated TM, the description-size of the TM M to be obfuscated, and the security parameter. (Note that, in particular, it is independent of the maximum space of the computation.) While this is a remarkable result, the dependence upon the maximum input length is still a drawback of this work -a drawback that our work does not encounter. In applications of iO for TMs such as non-black-box simulation [PPS15] , it is crucial that there is no a-priori polynomial upper bound on the input length of the obfuscated TM. Furthermore, we note that our con-struction is significantly simpler than the iO-based construction of [KLW14] and relies only on polynomial hardness assumptions; in contrast [KLW14] (as well as [LP14, CHJV14, BGT14]) require sub-exponential hardness assumptions.
In [BCP14, ABG + 13], diO for circuits, together with SNARKs [BCCT12, BCCT13, BCC + 14], was shown to imply diO for Turing Machines with unbounded inputs, running time, and space complexity (we will refer to this setting as the setting of general Turing Machines). However, given the evidence of impossibility for diO, prior to our work, there was no method known to bootstrap from obfuscation for circuits to obfuscation for general Turing Machines based on a plausible and general obfuscation definition. We show that the construction and proofs of [BCP14, ABG
+ 13] can be adapted to the setting of public-coin diO: Specifically, we show that public-coin diO for NC 1 , together with fully homomorphic encryption with decryption in NC 1 , and public-coin SNARKs, imply diO for general Turing Machines. We note that our formulation of public-coin SNARK also avoids all known impossibility results for SNARKs and other extractability assumptions [BCPR14] .
Functional Encryption for Turing Machines with unbounded inputs.
We next tackle the problem of (selectively secure) functional encryption [SW05, BSW11] for Turing Machines with unbounded inputs. Here, we are able to show that public-coin diO for general Turing Machines together with standard cryptographic assumptions, implies selectively secure functional encryption for general Turing Machines. As mentioned above, the approach given in [BCP14] achieves full security for functional encryption, but does not adapt to the setting of publiccoin diO. The starting point for our scheme is the functional encryption construction given by [ABG + 13], however in the case of functional encryption, we must make several adjustments to both the construction and the proof of security in order to make use of public-coin diO, and avoid the need for security with respect to general auxiliary inputs. We note that for the case of single-key functional encryption [SS10] , the problem of supporting Turing machines and achieving input-specific runtimes was previously introduced and resolved by Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13a] under cryptographic assumptions that are incomparable to our work, but nevertheless, subject to the same criticism as the existence of diO.
Functional encryption is strict strengthening of many cryptographic notions including garbling schemes [Yao82, FKN94, BHR12] (also known as randomized encoding of functions [IK00, AIK06] ). Thus, our results for functional encryption imply results for garbling schemes (as well as other notions that are implied by functional encryption) under the public-coin diO assumptions of only polynomial hardness. In particular, this applies to several applications of garbling schemes discussed in recent works of [LP14, CHJV14, BGT14] (under incomparable assumptions). We refer the reader to [App11] for a survey of applications of garbling schemes in different areas of cryptography.
Other related works. Another general and plausible notion of obfuscation that strengthens iO is virtual gray box (VGB) obfuscation [BC14, BCKP14] .
While conceptually appealing, this notion does not seem as useful as diO for natural applications.
As briefly discussed above, current iO obfuscation candidates can be backed by security proofs in a generic multilinear model [BR14, BGK + 14]. One can draw an analogy between the broad challenge addressed in the present work and earlier works on instantiating random oracles. Similarly to the practical use of the random oracle model [BR93] , provable constructions in the generic multilinear model can give rise to heuristic real-world constructions by plugging in multilinear map candidates such as those from [GGH13a, CLT13] . This may be a reasonable heuristic leap of faith in the context of concrete natural applications. However, similarly to the negative results on instantiating random oracles [CGH04] , this methodology is provably not sound in general. Thus, one is left with the challenge of formulating a succinct and plausible assumption that can be satisfied by an explicit random oracle instantiation and suffices for a wide array of applications. Despite some partial progress (e.g., [Can97, BHK13] ), this challenge is still quite far from being fully met.
Our Definitions
Notation. We denote by N the set of all natural numbers, and use n ∈ N to denote the security parameter. An efficient non-uniform algorithm A is denoted by a family of circuits A = {A n } n∈N and an associated polynomial s such the size of A n is at most s(n) for all n ∈ N.
We denote by C = {C n } n∈N a parameterized collection of circuits such that C n is the set of all circuits of size at most n. Likewise, we denote by M = {M n } n∈N a parameterized collection of Turing machines (TM) such that M n is the set of all TMs of size at most n which halt within polynomial number steps on all inputs. For x ∈ {0, 1} * , if M halts on input x, we denote by steps(M, x) the number of steps M takes to output M (x). Following [ABG + 13], we adopt the convention that the output M (x) includes the number of steps M takes on x, in addition to the "official" output. When clear from the context, we drop n ∈ N from the notation.
Circuits
We first define the notion of a public-coin differing-inputs sampler.
Definition 1 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Sampler for Circuits). An efficient non-uniform sampling algorithm Sam = {Sam n } is called a public-coin differing-inputs sampler for the parameterized collection of circuits C = {C n } if the output of Sam n is distributed over C n ×C n and for every efficient non-uniform algorithm A = {A n } there exists a negligible function ε such that for all n ∈ N:
The definition insists that the sampler and the attacker circuits both receive the same random coins as input. Therefore, Sam cannot keep any "secret" from A. We now define the notion of public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator. The crucial change from existing diO definitions is that the distinguisher now gets the actual coins of the sampler as the auxiliary input.
Definition 2 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for Circuits). A uniform PPT algorithm O is a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the parameterized collection of circuits C = {C n } if the following requirements hold:
for every public-coin differing-inputs samplers Sam = {Sam n } for the collection C, every efficient non-uniform (distinguishing) algorithm D = {D n }, there exists a negligible function ε s.t. for all n:
where the probability is taken over r and the coins of O.
Turing machines
We now present our definitions for the case of Turing machines.
Definition 3 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Sampler for TMs). An efficient non-uniform sampling algorithm Sam = {Sam n } is called a public-coin differing-inputs sampler for the parameterized collection of TMs M = {M n } if the output of Sam n is always a pair of Turing machines (M 0 , M 1 ) ∈ M n × M n such that |M 0 |= |M 1 | and for all efficient non-uniform (attacker) algorithms A = {A n } there exists a negligible function ε such that for all n ∈ N:
Remark. By requiring A n to output 1 t , we rule out all inputs x for which M 0 , M 1 may take more than polynomial steps.
Definition 4 (Public-Coin Differing-Inputs Obfuscator for TMs). A uniform PPT algorithm O is a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the parameterized collection of TMs M = {M n } if the following requirements hold:
for every public-coin differing-inputs samplers Sam = {Sam n } for the collection M, for every efficient non-uniform (distinguishing) algorithm D = {D n }, there exists a negligible function ε s.t. for all n:
-Succinctness and input-specific running time: there exists a (global) polynomial s such that for all n, for all M ∈ M n , for all M ← O(1 n , M ), and for all x ∈ {0, 1} * , steps(M , x) ≤ s (n, steps(M, x)).
Remark. The size of the obfuscated machine M is always bounded by the running time of O which is polynomial in n. More importantly, the size of M is independent of the running time of M . This holds even if we consider TMs which always run in polynomial time. This is because the polynomial bounding the running time of O is independent of the collection M being obfuscated. It is easy to obtain a uniform formulation from our current definitions.
Preliminaries
Succinct non-interactive arguments. The universal relation [BG02] is defined to be the set R U of instance-witness pairs (y, w) such that y is of the form (M, x, t), |w|≤ t, and M is a TM which accepts (x, w) within t steps where t is an arbitrary number in N. For constant c ∈ N, we define R c to the subset of R U consisting of those pairs {(y, w) = ((M, x, t), w)} for which t ≤ |x| c . The language corresponding to a relation R ⊆ R U will be denoted by L R .
We recall the definitions of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARG) and succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARK) below. We require that these systems be publicly verifiable and work in the common random string model where any uniformly random string of sufficient length can act as the CRS. Our definition follows the standard formulations [BCCT12, BCP14] .
Definition 5 (SNARG).
A pair of algorithms (P, V ) is a (publicly verifiable) SNARG for a relation R ⊆ R U in the common random string model if there exist polynomials p, q, (independent of R) such that the following conditions are satisfied:
-Completeness: ∀(y, w) ∈ R, it holds that Pr V (crs, y, π) = 1 : crs ← {0, 1} poly(n) , π ← P (crs, y, w) = 1, and for every crs, P (crs, y, w) halts within p(n, |y|, t) where y = (M, x, t).
-Succinctness: for every (crs, y, w) ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) × R the size of π ← P (crs, y, w) is bounded by (n, log t) and the running time of V (crs, y, π) is bounded by q(n + |y|) = q(n + |M |+|x|+ log t).
-Adaptive soundness: for every polynomial-size prover P * = {P * n }, there exists a negligible function ε such that for all n:
Observe that the soundness condition is not required to hold with respect to common auxiliary input of any kind. This notion suffices for the restricted cases where obfuscation size grows with the maximum supported input length (a.k.a. bounded-input case). To deal with inputs of unbounded polynomial length, we need the following stronger notion.
Definition 6 (SNARK).
A pair of algorithms (P, V ) is a (publicly verifiable) SNARK for the relation R ⊆ R U in the common random string model if it satisfies the completeness and succinctness conditions of definition 5 (above) and the following argument-of-knowledge property:
-Adaptive argument of knowledge: for every polynomial-size prover P * = {P * n }, there exists a polynomial-size extractor E P * = {E n } and a negligible function ε such that for all n:
Observe that in this definition a uniformly distributed auxiliary input z is allowed. As noted in [BCCT12] , none of the existing implausibility results regarding the existence of SNARKs or extractable one-way/collision-resistant-hash functions apply to the case where auxiliary input is a uniformly random string. A candidate construction (and perhaps the only one at this time) for such SNARKs is Micali's CS proof system [Mic94] .
We remark that the above definition requires the extraction to succeed with probability almost 1. Our results do not require this strong form of extraction, and work with a weaker notion as well where extraction probability is only required to be negligibly close to the success probability of the cheating prover.
We shall also use fully homomorphic encryption and non-interactive strong witness indistinguishable proofs, e.g., [FLS99] . We discuss them in appendix A.
Bootstrapping Obfuscation from NC 1 to Turing Machines
In this section, we show that given a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class NC 1 , we can construct a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the parameterized collection M n of all polynomial-time TMs. The construction is a slightly simplified version of [ABG + 13] where we get rid of the hash functions. We shall prove the following theorem. Theorem 1. If there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for circuits in the class NC 1 , a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC 1 , and a public-coin SNARK for R U in the common random string model, there exists a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscator for the class of all polynomial-time Turing machines accepting inputs of unbounded polynomial length.
We first present the construction, and then prove the theorem. Let M = {M n } n∈N be a parameterized collection of polynomial-time TMs that accepts inputs of unbounded polynomial length, i.e., there exists a constant c ∈ N such that every M ∈ M n is of size n, takes inputs of length at most n c , and halts within n c steps. We adopt the convention that c is included in the description of M . Let FHE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) be a fully homomorphic encryption scheme with decryption in NC 1 and Π = (P, V ) be a SNARK for the relation R U defined earlier. The description of our obfuscator for M, and its evaluation algorithm, are as follows.
Obfuscator O (1 n , M ∈ M n ): By convention, description of M includes a constant c bounding the running time of M on all inputs by n c . Let U n be an oblivious universal TM which on input the description of a TM B, and a string x executes B on x for no more than n c steps. The obfuscator proceeds in the following steps:
1. Generate two FHE public-keys (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 1 ) and (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 2 ). 2. Encrypt M under both FHE public-keys: g 1 ← Enc pk1 (M ; v 1 ) and g 2 ← Enc pk2 (M ; v 2 ). Here M is assumed to be encoded as a bit string of length n for use by the universal TM U n . 3. Uniformly sample crs ← {0, 1} poly(n) of sufficient length (for the SNARK Π). 4. Generate an obfuscation of the NC 1 -program P 1 crs sk1,g1,g2 given in figure 1:
5. Output M = (P , crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , g 1 , g 2 ).
Evaluation of M : Evaluate M = (P , crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , g 1 , g 2 ) on input x as follows:
1. Compute (e 1 , e 2 ) = M Eval (x). This takes at most n 2c steps. See fig. 1 for M Eval . 2. Compute a SNARK proof π using x as the witness and t = n 4c as the time-bound: π ← P crs, ( M Eval , (e 1 , e 2 ), t), x 3. Compute a low-depth proof φ for the NP-statement 1 = V (crs, ( M Eval , (e 1 , e 2 ), t), π). This can be done by providing the entire computation of V on these inputs. 4. Execute P (e 1 , e 2 , t, π, φ) and output the result.
The construction is now analyzed in the proof below. We denote by a b the concatenation of two bit strings a and b.
Proof of theorem 1. The correctness and succinctness of this construction are relatively straightforward to verify, and in particular, closely follow the analyses in [ABG + 13, BCP14]. We analyze its security.
• Input: a tuple (e1, e2, t, π, φ), Constants: crs, sk1, g1, g2, pk1, pk2.
• Check that t ≤ 2 n and φ is a valid low-depth proof for the NPstatement:
where M Eval is defined as follows. Let M Eval be the computation that takes x as input, has (pk1, pk2, g1, g2) hardcoded, and homomorphically evaluates Un(·, x) on g1 and g2 to produce e1 and e2 respectively. I.e., e1 = Eval pk 1 (Un(·, x), g1) and e2 = Eval pk 2 (Un(·, x), g2).
M Eval takes as input an instance of the form (e1, e2) and a witness x; it accepts if and only if M Eval (x) outputs (e1, e2) within 2 n steps.
• If the check fails, output ⊥; otherwise output Dec sk 1 (e1).
• Same as P 1 crs sk 1 ,g 1 ,g 2 except that if the check is successful, it outputs Dec sk 2 (e2). 
We need to show that X n (0) ≈ c X n (1). Consider the following sequence of hybrid experiments.
-H 0 : This hybrid corresponds to an honest sampling of X n (0). In this case, M creates two FHE encryptions of M 0 , namely g 1 and g 2 (where M 0 is the first output of Sam n ). -H 1 : Same as H 0 except that the second FHE ciphertext is now generated as an encryption of M 1 , i.e., g 2 = Enc pk2 (M 1 ) (where M 1 is the second output of Sam n ). -H 2 : Same as H 1 except that the obfuscated program P is now generated as an obfuscation of P 2 crs sk2,g1,g2 which decrypts the second ciphertext using sk 2 , i.e., P ← O NC 1 (1 n , P 2 crs sk2,g1,g2 ). -H 3 : Same as H 2 except that the first FHE ciphertext g 1 is now also generated as an encryption of M 1 , i.e., g 1 ← Enc pk1 (M 1 ). -H 4 : Same as H 3 except that the obfuscated program P is once again generated as an obfuscation of P 1 crs sk1,g1,g2 , i.e., P ← O NC 1 (1 n , P 1 crs sk1,g1,g2 ). Note that H 4 is identical to X n (1).
We now prove that each hybrid in this sequence is indistinguishable from the previous one.
Step 1: H 0 ≈ c H 1 . This follows from the IND-CPA security of FHE. Formally, consider an adversary A FHE , who receives a challenge public-key pk, then samples (M 0 , M 1 ) ← Sam n (r) for a random r, and receives an honestly generated ciphertext g to either M 0 or M 1 under pk. A FHE then generates an obfuscation of M 0 following the instruction of O except that it sets pk 2 = pk and g 2 = g. Note that all instructions of O can indeed be performed efficiently knowing only (pk 2 , g 2 ). Let M denote the resulting obfuscation which includes an NC 1 -obfuscation P of program P 1 crs sk1,g1,g2=g . A FHE outputs whatever D n (r, M ) outputs. The output of A FHE is distributed identically to that of H b when g is an encryption of M b where b ∈ {0, 1}. Because Sam n and D n are of polynomial-size, it follows that A FHE is a polynomial-size circuit violating IND-CPA security of FHE unless H 0 ≈ c H 1 .
Step 2: H 1 ≈ c H 2 . We use the soundness of SNARK and diO-security of O NC 1 to argue that H 1 ≈ c H 2 . Suppose that H 1 and H 2 are not computationally indistinguishable. We use Sam n and D n to construct a public-coin differing-inputs sampler Sam 3. Set crs = ρ 1 , (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 1 ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 2 ). 4. Set g 1 ← Enc pk1 (M 0 ; v 1 ) and g 2 ← Enc pk2 (M 1 ; v 2 ).
5. Output (C 0 , C 1 ) corresponding to the programs P 1 crs sk1,g1,g2 , P 2 crs sk2,g1,g2 .
Note that input to the circuits C 0 , C 1 above are of the form m = (e 1 , e 2 , t, π, φ). Proof. We have to show that every non-uniform PPT attacker {A which succeeds against our sampler, we construct an attacker A n which will succeed against the given sampler Sam n We shall rely on the soundness of SNARK to prove this.
Claim. ∀n ∈ N Sam
Formally, suppose that the claim is false, and there exists a polynomial-size attacker family {A NC 1 n }, a polynomial p, and infinitely many n s.t.
We start by defining a prover family which receives a uniformly random auxiliary input, denoted by z, and then use it to define an attacker A n which also receives a uniform auxiliary input. Later on, this auxiliary input will be completely removed from A n .
Prover P * n (crs, z): String z is of the form (r, u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) and the circuit has adversary A , (e 1 , e 2 ), t) .
Output (y, π).
Let {E * n } be a family of extractor circuits w.r.t. the prover family {P * n } defined above. Now we define the following attacker circuit A n which receives a uniformly random auxiliary input z * and outputs a differing input for the given sampler Sam n . Later we will choose an appropriate z * and hardcode it as part of the circuit description to achieve an attacker circuit without auxiliary input.
Circuit A n (r, z * ): String z * is of the form (ρ 1 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) and extractor circuit E * n is hardcoded in this circuit. The circuit computes as follows: 1. Define crs = ρ 1 and z = (r, u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) using r and z * . 2. Compute (y, w) ← E * n (crs, z) where y is of the form y := ( M Eval , (e 1 , e 2 ), t). 3. Output x = w as the differing input.
For any given r, z * , the concatenation ρ = r z * is of the form (r, ρ 1 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ), and defines a valid random string for A NC 1 n . We say that a fixed string z * is good if, the success probability of A fraction of z * are good. Now let us define sound strings. Roughly speaking, we say that z * is sound if the probability that the output of A NC 1 n (ρ) contains a valid proof π but the output of the extractor (in step 2 above) is not a valid witness, is less than 1/4p.
Formally, we say that a fixed string z * = (ρ 1 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ) is sound if for a randomly chosen r, defining the tape ρ = r z * , the probability of the following event, taken over r, is at most 1/4p: the output of E * (crs, z) (in step 2 of A n (r, z * )) is (y, w) and output of A NC 1 n (ρ) is m = (e 1 , e 2 , t, π, φ) such that V accepts the proof π for the statement y but w is not a valid witness, i.e. (y, w) / ∈ R 2c . A randomly chosen z * contains a uniformly distributed crs string; therefore, it follows that at least 1 − ε fraction of z * are sound where ε is the soundness error of SNARK.
Therefore, at least Further, by definition of sound, at most a 1/4p fraction of such inputs r are such that the extractor E * n (in step 2 above) will not output a valid witness w. Therefore, at least
4p of inputs r result in a differing-input where the extractor's output is a valid witness. We call such inputs nice.
By construction, for nice r, we have that:
where x = w is the differing-input output by A n , and the last implication follows because x is a valid witness, i.e. if m contains ciphertexts e 1 , e 2 then the values in these ciphertexts will indeed be M 0 (x) and M 1 (x) respectively. Here M 0 , M 1 are the TMs sampled in (step 2 of) the execution of Sam NC 1 n (r z * ). We now observe that, by construction, (M 0 , M 1 ) are also the output of Sam n (r). Therefore, the output of A n outputs a differing input x for the outputs of Sam n whenever z * is good and sound and r is nice.
To have a deterministic attacker A n which on input r outputs a differinginput x, we choose a z * that is good and sound, and hardcode it in the description of A n . It follows that, since the fraction of nice strings r is at least 1/4p, A n violates the public-coin differing-input property of Sam n with noticeable property. The proof is completed by observing that circuits output by Sam We now present distinguisher D (ρ). The distinguisher attempts to create a valid obfuscation M of the TM implicitly present in C . Since entire string ρ is available, it can be efficiently done as follows.
1. Parse ρ as ρ = (r, ρ 1 , u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 ), and set crs = ρ 1 , (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 1 ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← Gen(1 n ; u 2 ), g 1 ← Enc pk1 (M 0 ; v 1 ) and g 2 ← Enc pk2 (M 1 ; v 2 ), where (M 0 , M 1 ) ← Sam(1 n ; r). 2. Define M = (C , crs, pk 1 , pk 2 , g 1 , g 2 ), and output whatever D n (r, M ) outputs. (Recall that D n is the given distinguisher).
By construction of Sam Final step: H 2 ≈ c H 3 and H 3 ≈ c H 4 . Proof for the claim H 2 ≈ c H 3 is nearly identical to step 1. The proof for H 3 ≈ c H 4 is nearly identical to step 2. We omit the details.
Functional Encryption for Turing Machines
In this section, we shall construct a functional encryption scheme. The scheme can encrypt messages of arbitrary polynomial length. The secret key SK M is given corresponding to a TM M of polynomial size which can accept inputs of arbitrary polynomial length and halts in polynomial time. The holder of SK M can learn the value of M (x) given an encryption of x. The size of the publicparameters of our scheme is polynomial in the security parameter, and the size of secret-keys, say SK M , is polynomial in the security parameter, |M |, and log t where t is an arbitrary polynomial bounding the worst case running time of M .
We assume familiarity with the definition of functional encryption (FE) schemes. Our scheme will satisfy indistinguishability based notion of security in the selective model of security which we recall here. In this model, we consider the following experiment Expt between an attacker A and a challenger. The experiment takes a bit b as input, and proceeds as follows:
The challenger samples (pp, msk) ← F.Setup(1 n ) and sends pp to A. Phase 2 A adaptively asks polynomially secret-key queries where in each query it sends the description of a TM M ∈ M such that M (x * 1 ) = M (x * 2 ).
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The challenger responds with SK M ← F.KeyGen(pp, msk, M ). Challenge The challenger sends an encryption e = F.Enc(pp, x * b ). Phase 3 Phase 2 is repeated. Output The output A is the output of the experiment, which is a bit without loss of generality.
The scheme is said to be selectively secure if Adv A is negligible in n where we define
Our construction. Let O be a public-coin differing-inputs obfuscation for the class of polynomial-size and polynomial-time TMs taking inputs of arbitrary polynomial length. Let Π = (CRSGen, P, V ) be a statistically sound, noninteractive, strong witness-indistinguishable proof system for NP where CRSGen simply outputs its own random coins-therefore, we are in the common random string model where any random string of sufficient length can act as the CRS. Let H = {H n } be a family of collision-resistant hash functions such that every h ∈ H n maps strings from {0, 1} * to {0, 1} n . Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an ordinary, semantically secure public-key encryption scheme, and com be a statistically binding commitment scheme. 6 We assume that PKE (resp., com) encrypts (resp., commits) to a string of unbounded polynomial length by individually encrypting (resp., committing) to each bit. We assume w.l.o.g. that PKE (resp., com) uses randomness of length n to encrypt (resp., commit) to a single bit (and therefore sn random bits for a string of length s will be needed).
The algorithms of our functional encryption scheme are as follows. Recall that a b denotes the concatenation of two bit strings a and b.
-F.Setup(1 n ): Generate (pk 1 , sk 1 ) ← Gen(1 n ), (pk 2 , sk 2 ) ← Gen(1 n ), and (pk 3 , sk 3 ) ← Gen(1 n ). Generate two commitments α 1 = com(0 n ; u 1 ) and α 2 = com(0 n ; u 2 ). Sample crs ← CRSGen(1 n ) and h ← H n . Output (pp, msk) where:
pp := (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 , crs, h), msk := sk 1 . (a; r 3 ) . Finally, compute a proof π for the statement that y ∈ L fe using w = (a, r 3 ) as the witness where y = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 ): i.e., π ← P (crs, y, w).
7 Here L fe is is the language corresponding to the relation R fe defined below.
Relaton R fe : Instance: y = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 ) Witness: w = (a , r 3 ) where a = x 1 r 1 u 1 x 2 r 2 u 2 R fe (y , w ) = 1 if and only if the following condition holds:
1. c 3 = Enc pk3 (a ; r 3 ); and 2. The or of the following two statements is true:
(a) c 1 , c 2 encrypt the same message which is one of x 1 or x 2 , i.e.: (c 1 = Enc pk 1 (x 1 ; r 1 ) and c 2 = Enc pk 2 (x 1 ; r 2 )); or (c 1 = Enc pk 1 (x 2 ; r 1 ) and c 2 = Enc pk 2 (x 2 ; r 2 )); (b) c 1 , c 2 encrypt x 1 , x 2 respectively, which may be different but then the hash of one them is committed in α 1 , α 2 ; i.e., i. (c 1 = Enc pk 1 (x 1 ; r 1 ) and c 2 = Enc pk 2 (x 2 ; r 2 )); and ii. (α 1 = com(h(x 1 ); u 1 ) or α 1 = com(h(x 2 ); u 1 )); and iii. (α 2 = com(h(x 1 ); u 2 ) or α 2 = com(h(x 2 ); u 2 )). Proof π is computed for the and of statements 1 and 2(a) of R fe . The algorithm outputs e = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , π) as the ciphertext. Program Prog M,msk :
• Input: a ciphertext e of the form e = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , π).
• Constants: msk = sk 1 and pp = (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 , crs, h).
• The program checks that 1 = V (crs, y, π) where y = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 ).
• If the check fails, output ⊥; otherwise output M (Dec sk1 (c 1 )). -F.Dec(SK M , e): Evaluate the program SK M on input e and output whatever it outputs.
Theorem 2. Let M be the class of all polynomial-time Turing machines accepting inputs of unbounded polynomial length. If there exists a public-coin differinginputs obfuscator for the class M, a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system (i.e., with statistical soundness) for NP in the common random string model, a public-key encryption scheme, a non-interactive perfectly-binding commitment scheme, and a family of collision-resistant hash functions with publicly samplable index, then there exists a selectively-secure functional encryption scheme with indistinguishability-based security for Turing machines in the class M.
Proof of theorem 2. The correctness and succinctness of our scheme is easy to verify, and in particular, is similar to analyses in [GGH + 13b, ABG + 13]. We shall provide this analysis in the full version. We now analyze the security of this construction. We prove that the scheme satisfies indistinguishability based security for FE in the selective security model. We prove this by considering the following sequence of hybrid experiments:
-Hybrid H 0 : This hybrid is identical to experiment Expt(0). The publicparameters pp in Phase 1 are of the form pp := (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 , crs, h) where α 1 = com(0 n ; u 1 ) and α 2 = com(0 n ; u 2 ). -Hybrid H 1 : This hybrid is identical to H 0 except that α 1 and α 2 are computed as commitments to h(x * 0 ) and h(x * 1 ) respectively: α 1 = com(h(x * 0 ); u 1 ) and α 2 = com(h(x * 1 ); u 2 ). We recall that the challenge ciphertext is of the form (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , π) where both c 1 , c 2 encrypt x * 0 , c 3 encrypts a 0 = x * 0 r 1 0 n 2 x * 0 r 2 0 n 2 using randomness r 3 , and π is computed using w = (a 0 , r 3 ) as the witness. This is identical to how these values were computed in the previous hybrid.
-Hybrid H 2 : Identical to H 2 except that string a 0 is now changed to a * = x * 0 r 1 u 1 x * 1 r 2 u 2 . Consequently, ciphertext c 3 is an encryption of a * which we denote by c * 3 . Since a * has changed, the witness used in computing the proof π has also changed, and we shall denote the new proof by π * . The challenge ciphertext is therefore (c 1 , c 2 , c * 3 , π * ) where both c 1 , c 2 still encrypt x * 0 .
-Hybrid H 3 : Same as H 2 except that c 2 now encrypts x * 1 . Furthermore, π * is computed w.r.t. the and of statements 1 and 2(b) (see the description of R fe ). That is, the witness corresponding to condition 2(b.i) will now be (x constants are (msk, pp). The program outputs ⊥ if π is not a valid proof; otherwise it outputs M (Dec sk2 (c 2 )).
-Hybrid H 5 Same as H 4 except that c 1 is now changed to encrypt x * 1 . Furthermore, π * is computed by using the witness corresponding to condition 2(a), i.e., using (x * 1 , r 1 , r 2 ).
-Hybrid H 6 : Same as H 5 except that all secret-key queries are now switched back to using msk = sk 1 and the key for TM M is an obfuscation of the program Prog M,msk . -Hybrid H 7 : Same as H 6 except that a * is changed to string a 1 = x * 1 r 1 0
The witness corresponding to 2(a) does not change, but corresponding to statement in 1 changes (see R fe ). Therefore, proof π also changes. -Hybrid H 8 : Same as H 7 except that α 1 , α 2 are switched back to the commitments of 0 n . Observe that H 8 is identical to the experiment Expt(1).
We now prove the indistinguishability of every two consecutive hybrids in this experiment.
Step 1: H 0 ≈ c H 1 . This follows from computational hiding of the commitment scheme. Formally, we consider the following adversary A com , which internally executes the hybrid H 0 except that it does not generate commitments (α 1 , α 2 ) on its own. Instead, after receiving values (x * 1 , x * 2 ) during Init phase from A, it sends two sets of strings, namely (0 n , 0 n ) and (h(x * 1 ), h(x * 2 )), to the outside challenger and receives in return two commitments (α 1 , α 2 ) corresponding to either the first or the second set of strings. It is clear that A com is a polynomial time machine, and violates the hiding of com unless H 0 ≈ c H 1 .
Step 2: H 1 ≈ c H 2 . The proof of this claim relies on the semantic security of PKE and the strong witness indistinguishability of the proof system Π for polynomially many statements.
8 Recall that strong WI asserts the following: let D 0 and D 1 be distributions which output an instance-witness pair for an NP-relation R and suppose that the first components of these distributions are computationally indistinguishable, i.e., {y : (y, w) ← D 0 (1 n )} ≈ c {y : (y, w) ← D 1 (1 n )}; then X 0 ≈ c X 1 where X b : {(crs, y, π) : crs ← CRSGen(1 n ); (y, w) ← D 0 (1 n ); π ← P (crs, y, w)} for b ∈ {0, 1}. Strong WI for polynomially many statements is implied by any multi-theorem NIZK proof such as [FLS99] .
Suppose that H 1 and H 2 can be distinguished with noticeable advantage δ. Observe that both distribution internally sample the following values in an identical manner: z := (h, pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , c 1 , c 2 , α 1 , α 2 ) which is all but crs, c 3 and π. By simple averaging, there are at least δ/2 fraction of string st s.t. the two hybrids can be distinguished with advantage at least δ/2 when z = st. Call such a z good. Fix one such z, and denote the resulting hybrids by H , c 2 , c 3 , pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 ) , witness w 0 = (a 0 , r 3 ); output (y, w 0 ). Note that y has identical to z except that h has been removed and c 3 has been added. Now define a second distribution D 1 . Therefore, we must have that X 0 ≈ X 1 w.r.t. these distributions. We show that this is not the case unless
Consider an adversary for strong WI who incorporates A and z (along with sk 1 and all values for computing z described above), and receives a challenge (crs, y, π) distributed according to either D The adversary uses crs to completely define pp and feeds it to A; it uses sk 1 to complete phase 2 and 4, and (c 3 , π) to define the challenge ciphertext e = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ). The adversary outputs whatever A outputs. We observe that the output of this adversary is distributed according to H 2 ) when it receives a tuple from distribution X 0 (resp., X 1 ). A randomly sampled z is good with probability at least δ/2, and therefore it follows that with probability at least δ 2 /4 the strong WI property will be violated unless δ is negligible.
Step 3: H 2 ≈ c H 3 . The proof of this part follows exactly the same ideas as in step 2, and relies on the semantic security of encryption and strong WI property of Π. Roughly speaking, changing c 2 to encrypt x * 1 results in a computationally indistinguishable distribution over the statement (to be proven by proof π). Due to this, although the resulting proof π will use a different witness, strong WI guarantees that the joint distribution of statement and proof (present in the challenge ciphertext) remains computationally indistinguishable in these two hybrids. The details are omitted.
Step 4: H 3 ≈ c H 4 . This is the key part of our proof where we shall rely on the indistinguishability security of public-coin diO. Suppose that the claim is false and A's output in H 3 is noticeably different from its output in H 4 . Suppose that A's running time is bounded by a polynomial t so that there are at most t secretkey queries it can make in phase 2 and 3 combined. We consider a sequence of t hybrid experiments between H 3 and H 3 such that hybrid H The description of these two algorithms is as follows:
2. Parse ρ as (crs, h, τ ). 3. Proceed identically to H 4 using τ as randomness for all tasks except for sampling the hash function which is set to h, and the CRS, which is set to crs. This involves the following steps: (a) Parse τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 , r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , u 1 , u 3 ). (b) Use τ i as randomness to generate (pk i , sk i ) ← Gen(1 n ; τ i ) for i ∈ [3], r 1 , r 2 to generate c 1 = Enc pk1 (x * 0 ; r 1 ), c 2 = Enc pk1 (x * 1 ; r 2 ), and u 1 , u 2 to generate α 1 = com(h(x * 0 ); u 1 ), α 2 = com(h(x * 1 ); u 2 ). (c) Use a * = x * 0 r 1 u 1 x * 1 r 2 u 2 and r 3 to compute c * 3 = Enc pk3 (a * ; r 3 ), and then use w = (a * , r 3 ) to compute proof π * corresponding to conditions 1 and 2(b) in R fe . 4. Define pp = (pk 1 , pk 2 , pk 3 , α 1 , α 2 , crs, h) and challenge e = (c 1 , c 2 , c * 3 , π * ). 5. Send pp to A and answer its secret-key queries as follows. For all queries M j until j < i, send an obfuscation of Prog M,sk1 . 6. If i-th secret-key query comes in phase 2, send ciphertext e in the challenge phase. 7. Upon receiving the i-th secret-key query M i , output (M 0 , M 1 ) and halt where:
Distinguisher D i A (ρ, M ): on input a random tape ρ and an obfuscated TM M , the distinguisher simply executes all steps of the sampler Sam i A (ρ), answering secret-keys for all j < i, as described above. The distinguisher, however, does not halt when i-th query is sent, and continues the execution of A answering secret-key queries for M j as follows:
-if j = i: send M (which is an obfuscation of either M 0 or M 1 ) -if j > i: send an obfuscation of Prog * Mj ,sk2
The distinguisher outputs whatever A outputs.
It is straightforward to see that if M is an obfuscation of M 1 , the output of D Let us now analyze the success probability of this algorithm. Since h is uniformly sampled, ρ is a uniform random tape, and therefore with probability µ, B outputs an e such that M 0 (e) = M 1 (e). Recall that M 0 = Prog Mi,sk1 and M 2 = Prog * Mi,sk2 for some TM M i such that M i (x * 0 ) = M * i (x * 1 ). Furthermore, both of these programs output ⊥ if proof π is not valid. Since the output these two programs differ on e, it must be that π is a valid proof so that M 0 (e) = M i (Dec sk1 (c 1 )) and M 1 (e) = M i (Dec sk2 (c 2 )). By construction, since π is a statistically sound proof, except with negligible probability it holds that x 1 = Dec sk1 (c 1 )) and x 2 = dec sk2 (c 2 ) where x 1 , x 2 are part of the string a obtained by the collision finding algorithm by decrypting c 3 above. Therefore, we have that M 0 (e) = M i (x 1 ) and M 1 (e) = M i (x 2 ). However, we also have that M 0 (e) = M 1 (e) =⇒ M i (x 1 ) = M i (x 2 ) =⇒ x 1 = x 2 . Since M i (x * 0 ) = M i (x * 1 ) it holds that the sets {x 1 , x 2 } = {x * 0 , x * 1 }. Since π is valid, and c 1 , c 2 are encryptions of (unequal strings) x 1 , x 2 , from the statistical soundness of π statements 2(b.ii) and 2(b.iii) must be true. That is, α 1 (likewise α 2 ) must be a commitment to one of h(x 1 ) or h(x 2 ). But α 1 is a commitment to h(x * 0 ) and α 2 is a commitment to h(x * 1 ) and commitment is statistically binding. Since at least one of x 1 , x 2 is not equal to any of x * 0 , x * 1 the collision must occur on one of the four possible pairs of these strings.
Step 5: Indistinguishability of H 4 -H 8 . Hybrids H 4 to H 8 are applying changes very similar to the first four hybrids except in the reverse order. The proof of their indistinguishability can be obtained by following previous proofs in a near identical fashion. In particular we can prove H 4 ≈ c H 5 by relying on the security of encryption and strong WI (following the proof in step 2 or 3), H 5 ≈ c H 6 following the proof in step 4, H 6 ≈ c H 7 following the proof in step 2, and H 7 ≈ c H 8 following the proof in step 1.
This completes the proof of security of our functional encryption scheme.
